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From Human Tissue to Human Bodies: Donation, 
Interventions, & Justified Distinctions? 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews the latest report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 
Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine and Research. It argues that the 
report represents a notable evolution in the Council's position regarding 
the appropriate governance of the human body and biomaterials. It then 
goes on to examine in more depth one of the report's recommendations – 
that a pilot payment scheme for eggs for research purposes should be 
trialled. In particular, it looks at whether the distinctions drawn, first, 
between eggs for research and therapeutic purposes and, secondly, between 
eggs for research and other biomaterials can be adequately justified. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1258/ce.2011.012012  
 
1. Introduction 
The latest report from the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Human Bodies: 
Donation for Medicine and Research,1 was published in October 2011. The 
foreword identifies the main task of the report as examining the question 
“how far can society go in its demands on people to act in what many 
regard as a good cause – that of providing bodily material to benefit 
others?” As such, it explores the ethical, legal, and social implications of 
individuals providing tissue and other biomaterials for both medicine and 
research. This encompasses a diverse range of biomaterials including not 
only blood (products), solid organs, tissue, gametes, embryos, and fetal 
material, but also the whole body after death and the living person as 
research subject (p.35).
1
 The activities and circumstances involving the use 
of the biomaterials are no less wide-ranging. The result is a comprehensive 
and informative report.2  
There is not space in what follows to outline all of the conclusions 
and recommendations contained in the report.3 Instead I examine the 
rationale for the support given to introducing a pilot payment scheme for 
eggs for research purposes should be trialled. I do this in order to examine 
whether the distinctions drawn, first, between eggs for research and 
therapeutic purposes and, secondly, between eggs for research and other 
biomaterials can be adequately justified. I also focus on these as a way of 
illuminating some aspects of the wider issue which pervades the report; the 
question of what constitutes an appropriate intervention in order to promote 
the donation of biomaterials. Before specifically looking at these, however, 
a look at the background to the report is warranted to illustrate how the 
advances in the biomedical arena have led to an evolution in policy-
orientated thinking with respect to the governance of human biomaterials. 
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2. Human tissue & (r)evolutionary principles? 
In 1995 the Nuffield Council published Human Tissue: Ethical and Legal 
Issues.4 This report dealt with similar issues to the current one, remarking 
that “[o]ne aspect of the recent and rapid advances in biological and 
medical research is that human tissue is being used in an increasing variety 
of new ways” (p. 1).
4
 Among the uses noted were blood transfusion, bone 
marrow transplantation, organ transplantation and reconstructive surgery, 
tissue replacement, studies of human tissue, diagnosis using cells, cell lines 
(basic and applied research), pathological examination, archiving and 
storage, and non-therapeutic applications such as DNA analysis for forensic 
purposes (pp. 31-8).
4
 The report provided a comprehensive analysis of 
many of the pertinent issues, along with a set of ethical, legal, and 
regulatory recommendations regarding uses of human tissue. Such uses of 
these materials, taken from both the living and the dead, might now seem 
commonplace to us. Yet, in the interim, biotechnological and medical 
developments have continued apace, with the Council noting that it has 
been a time of “considerable scientific, social, and legal change”.5 This 
prompted them revisit the issues and to launch another consultation in early 
2010.6 The resultant report represents a notable evolution in the Council’s 
position regarding the appropriate governance of the human body and 
biomaterials since its 1995 report.  
This evolution is most evident with regards to the issue of payments. 
The earlier report was strongly against the “procurement of human tissue 
for acceptable medical and scientific purposes along commercial lines” (p. 
52).
4
 Among other things it considered that permitting market transactions 
for human tissue might undermine consent, subvert altruistic motivations, 
and have negative implications for the safety of tissues supplied (pp. 50-1).
4
 
Conversely, the stance of the current report in relation to payment and 
altruism is more developed and nuanced. It recognises both that payments 
can take varied forms (and thus have different social meanings) and that 
they need not be damaging to an individual’s altruistic motivations. 
Regarding consent, the report says “we do not accept that the very existence 
of an incentive puts the free and voluntary nature of a person’s consent at 
risk” (p. 148).
1
 On the issue of safety the concern noted in the current report 
is that the biomaterials procured might be “more likely to be infected, 
unhealthy, or low-functioning” (p. 142).
1
 However, a review commissioned 
by the Council concluded that there is little empirical evidence in support of 
this proposition (pp. 165-7),
1
 but even if it were the case that “the remedy 




In the next section I explore the Council’s current stance in relation to 
payments and altruism. However, before I do, it is worth noting that the 
shift in position is evident not just in the substantive content of the report, 
but in the language employed. The earlier report spoke of ‘commercial 
dealings’ and ‘markets’, whereas the current one talks of ‘rewards’, 
‘incentives’, and ‘purchase’, none of which have the same connotations. 
This is more than simply dressing up the same issues in different clothing. 
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It is a re-framing of the debate and the issues in order to more aptly reflect 
the diversity of considerations at play regarding human biomaterials in 
contemporary biomedical science. A broad brush one size fits all approach 
is not going to capture the relevant factors that ought to be accounted for 
when thinking about how best to govern donation for medical and research 
purposes. This is not necessarily a criticism of the older report. The 
recommendations contained in it reflected the state-of-the-art of the use and 
uses of human tissue within biotechnological landscape and also the 
academic and policy debates of the time. However, sixteen years is a long 
time in medicine and the biosciences and the fast-pace of developments in 
the area rightly prompted the Council to re-visit the matter.  
 
3. Interventions: Payments & altruism   
The rubric, and some might say rhetoric, of altruism holds considerable 
sway in the ethical and policy debate on human tissue, in particular in 
relation to organ donation. A nuanced approach to this issue of incentives 
for human biomaterials has been advocated from within the academy for 
some time, even amongst those who reject the introduction of outright 
payments.7
,8,9,10,11,12 However, it has taken some time for this to start to 
trickle down to more policy-orientated fora. This latest report from the 
Nuffield Council is an example of where this is happening. It notes that 
while altruism “should continue to play a central role in ethical thinking in 
this field”(p. 156),
1
 other approaches are not precluded. They recognise any 
requirement that a donor’s altruism be ‘pure’ belies the complexity behind 
decisions to provide organs and tissues for either transplantation or research 
and that persons may have “mixed motivations” for donating (p. 139).
1
 The 
report is clear that altruism and interventions classed as ‘payment’ need not 
be “mutually exclusive” (p. 139).
1
 While a person may be motivated by a 
desire to help others when they donate biomaterials, there may also be other 
reasons and factors at play; for example, worries about loss of income 
might deter someone from becoming a living kidney donor. In such cases 
permitting the reimbursement of expenses and lost earnings could be seen 
as a facilitator of rather than an encumbrance to a person’s altruistic 
motivations (pp. 139-40).1,12 Thus, the report explicitly recognises that there 
may be times when it is appropriate to allow payments to be permitted for 
human biomaterials.  
We should note, however, that ‘payment’ in the report is an 
overarching term which includes purchase, reward, and recompense: (1) 
recompense is defined as reimbursement for direct financial losses brought 
about because of the donation, including “compensation for non-financial 
losses (discomfort, inconvenience, and time)” (p. 70);
1
 (2) reward as 
receiving material advantage over and above mere recompense to a person 
for donating; and (3) purchase as the direct exchange of bodily materials for 
payment (p. 70).
1
 Although distinctions are drawn between the three 
categories of payments, it is not done with the purpose of arguing that only 
payments which count as recompense ought to be permitted. It does not 
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seem overly contentious, in the case of the reimbursement example above, 
to suggest that individuals who donate organs for transplantation or tissues 
for research ought not to be left financially worse off because they do so. 
The report, however, goes further than this. It makes a case for offering 
rewards and recompense in certain well-circumscribed situations; for 
example, paying funeral costs for those who sign up to the Organs Donor 
Register and “die in circumstances where they could be organ donors” (p. 
175)
1
 and recompense beyond actual financial losses incurred for eggs 
donated for research. The latter of these will be discussed later. 
Whether or not it is appropriate to offer payments in particular 
circumstances is a context-specific question and is part of the wider task of 
determining which interventions ought to be pursued given the diverse uses 
and ends of human biological materials. Mindful of this, the report outlines 
six levels of interventions (their ‘intervention ladder’) which are seen as 
moving from altruism-focused to non-altruism-focused: 
1. relaying information about the need for bodily material for others’ 
treatment or for research (for example information campaigns); 
2. according recognition of, and gratitude for, altruistic donation, 
through whatever methods are appropriate both to the form of 
donation and the donor concerned (for example letters of thanks and 
certificates); 
3. intervening to remove barriers and disincentives to donation (for 
example ensuring full reimbursement of financial losses incurred in 
donating); 
4. offering token prompts to donate that may also be understood as a 
'thank you' (for example lottery tickets or vouchers for a cup of 
coffee); 
5. providing benefits in kind closely associated with the donation (for 
example egg-sharing arrangements); 
6. introducing financial incentives that leave the donor in a 
significantly better financial position (p. 108).
1
 
Of these the first four are framed as being altruist-focused, with the final 
two being non-altruist-focused. This distinction drawn between these 
interventions is not a line between those which do or do not attract 
payments. For example, the Council places the offering of small tokens 
amongst the altruist-focused interventions. This is because such tokens 
would be of nominal monetary value and are not the kinds of things that 
would prompt a donation from an individual not already predisposed to do 
so (p. 140).
1
 The purpose of such tokens is to express gratitude, but 
importantly they can also act as a way of conveying and reinforcing the 
message about the social good of donation.13 On the other hand, 
arrangements such as egg-sharing are placed on rung five of the ladder as a 
non-altruism-focused intervention. Unlike the case of small tokens, egg-
sharing arrangements do offer the kind of encouragement that would induce 
a woman who would not otherwise have done so to donate eggs (p. 140).
1
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Thus, the line in the sand with regards to altruism focuses on the 
motivations of the would-be donor and whether or not they would have 
been disposed to donate regardless of the intervention in question. Further, 
the distinction drawn between the altruism-focused and non-altruism-
focused interventions does not necessarily represent the line between 
activities which ought to be viewed as ethical and those which ought not to 
be (p. 140).
1
 The Council’s approach and analysis here is to be welcomed 
for a number of reasons. First, the move away from viewing altruism and 
incentives to donate as antithetical opens the door in the policy debate to 
the shades of grey that exist and ought to be considered in relation to the 
regulation of the donation of human biomaterials. Secondly, while 
recognising that different interventions may have varying effects on an 
individual’s willingness to donate, the report avoids making the erroneous 
claim that interventions, especially in the form of payments or other 
incentives, ought not to induce or persuade them to donate. As I have 
argued elsewhere, the very purpose of offering incentives is to prompt or 
persuade; “if individuals (or their families after death) were sufficiently 
motivated to make available their organs [or other biomaterials] . . . then 
this would negate the need to offer the incentive in the first place” (pp. 92-
3).
12
 Thirdly, it explicitly recognises that some non-monetary interventions 
can affect an individual’s motivations and influence their actions to a 
greater extent than certain monetary payments or their equivalent. Finally, 
and related to the preceding two points, the report notes that the mere fact 
that an incentive is given is not indicative of a coercive influence which 
undermines consent, even if it changes the balance of costs and benefits to 
be weighed up. Instead, it recognises if such influence is present, it will be 
context-dependent and rely on the specifics of the incentive scheme 
proposed (p. 141).
1
   
In the round this contextualised approach and analysis of the 
relationship between payments and altruism a propos human biomaterials 
represents long-awaited progress with regards to recommendations for 
policy. Nevertheless, although the report argues that we should offer 
rewards or incentives to encourage donation, and even permit direct 
purchase, this is only the case in certain situations and for specific 
materials. A notable endorsement in the report is related to eggs for 
research: it advocates trialling a scheme of paying for eggs for research 
purposes. This is in contrast to the fact that similar recommendations are 
not made in relation to other tissues used for research purposes or for eggs 
used for reproductive purposes. Therefore, it is to these asymmetries that I 
now turn. 
  
4. Eggs & other biomaterials: Justifying asymmetries?  
The Council is clear that donors ought not to be left worse off financially 
because of their decision to donate and are supportive of the recent decision 
by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority which raises the cap 
on the reimbursement of expenses for egg donation (for both treatment and 
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,15 However, they advocate going beyond this with regards to 
eggs donated for research purposes. They propose that a pilot scheme of 
payments for egg donation for research be introduced. Such payments 
would go beyond mere recompense for loss of earnings and other directly 
incurred expenses. The reason given for this is that egg donation for 
research is broadly analogous to participation in first-in-human trials and 
payment would be “compensation for the time, inconvenience and 
discomfort involved in donating” (p. 184).
1
 Yet, despite this, and being 
generally positive regarding egg-sharing arrangements, the report does not 
currently support payment beyond recompense for the donation of eggs for 
treatment, saying: 
[There is] a clear distinction can be made between the position 
of donors who in return receive a benefit directly associated 
with their donation (in the case of egg sharers, the opportunity 
to receive treatment that would otherwise not be available to 
them), and those who are invited to donate on the basis of 
simple financial reward(p. 183).
1 
In drawing a distinction between donation for research and donation for 
treatment an emphasis is placed on the notion of solidarity. The Council 
argues that “where there are no clear recipients (known or unknown) of the 
donated material, a move away from a primarily altruistic model of 
donation may not present a risk of undermining solidarity” (p. 183).
1
 But 
how does the notion of solidarity help to tell us whether or not payments are 
ethically permissible? 
 
4.1 Together we stand . . . sometimes 
Solidarity in this report is seemingly being deployed as a normative 
justification for permitting or not permitting particular courses of action. If 
this is the case then it prompts us to ask with whom we are meant to be 
standing and in the pursuit of which common values. The answer is to be 
found where the report notes that “the potential gains by others [from 
research] are . . . uncertain, remote, and impossible to link with any 
identifiable individual” (p. 183).
1
 This suggests that the requirements of 
solidarity are somehow fewer (or weaker) when it comes to those who are 
less identifiable, more remote from us (in time and perhaps distance), and 
where there is less certainty about the outcome of the research. I do not 
deny that the beneficiaries of any particular strand of research involving 
biomaterials may well be a more nebulous less identifiable group of people 
than those who directly benefit from transplants or egg donation for 
treatment. Nonetheless, we ought to question what we can justifiably mean 
when we use solidarity as a normative concept. When I speak of solidarity 
with my fellow man and woman, do I only stand with those who are near to 
me and (with) whom I can identify? And do I only stand with them when 
they are close both in terms of time and distance? If solidarity is to have 
any normative value, I doubt whether it should be interpreted in the kind of 
narrow context-specific sense it is seemingly deployed in this report. 
According Prainsack and Buyx, in another recent report “solidarity signifies 
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shared practices reflecting a collective commitment to carry ‘costs’ 
(financial, social, emotional, or otherwise) to assist others (p. 46)”.16 
Although not an official Council report this does cohere with the 
(sometimes) implicit use of the term in the Human Bodies report. Here 
solidarity is seen as “a communal commitment to the provision of materials 
needed by others for the preservation or improvement of their health” (p. 
183).
1
 On the face of it this would seem to encompass something more 
expansive than the treatment of ‘other infertile women like me’; for 
example, ‘others like me who benefit from health-related research’. Moral 
prohibitions and obligations, insofar as they extend to our fellow persons, 
would seem to rest on a much wider basis than mere synergies of particular 
personal attributes (e.g. infertility) held by those persons. Why it is morally 
incumbent upon me to aid those with infertility may have nothing to do 
with whether or not I am also infertile; instead this might be justified by an 
appeal to the well-being or flourishing of that particular person, or to the 
impact of infertility on their life plans, or even to the structure of the kind of 
society we want to live in.  
Of course, the Council is using solidarity to a slightly different 
normative end; to argue that payments are ethically more problematic 
where they undermine solidarity. This is why payments-in-kind via egg-
sharing is supported while direct payments for eggs for treatment are not; 
presumably those who are infertile are in some sense ‘in it together’ 
whereas the beneficiaries of research are not, or at least not to the same 
extent or in the same manner. After all, as Dawson and Verweij have 
recently noted a “core idea of solidarity is that the group as a whole shares 
the risks, burdens, or possible threats.”17 However, whatever role 
recognising these shared exigencies might play, it is not clear that solidarity 
or an appeal to communal values can do the normative work needed here. 
There are plenty of values that persons in liberal society share, but the fact 
that they share them does not explain why payments ought or ought not to 
be permitted; for example, teachers may value education and so may their 
students, but this does not tell us anything about the permissibility of 
paying them to share their wisdom and knowledge with those who have less 
of those things. Likewise, an appeal to the “communal commitment to the 
provision of materials needed by others for the preservation or 
improvement of their health” (p. 183)
1
 does not by itself tell us much about 
whether or not we can pay to get those things, let alone the reasons why.  
This is not to say that there is no useful work to be done by a concept 
of solidarity, it just may not have a relevant normative function in this 
context. Instead a more profitable route might be to view the appeal to 
solidarity as an empirical psychological claim about what motivates people. 
If so, the appeal may merely have an explanatory function. It may tell us 
why women may be willing to donate some of their eggs to other women 
also in need of fertility treatment, but not for research. Indeed this is what 
the studies into egg-sharing looked at by the Council revealed (p. 163).
1
 
The consequence of this is that allowing egg-sharing in treatment will have 
a practical impact that permitting payments will not. Meanwhile in the 
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research context, absent the motivation of the reduced cost of IVF and 
payments may be required to achieve the desired outcome of increased 
numbers of eggs for research. Nevertheless, whether solidarity is going to 
function descriptively or normatively it is, as Dawson and Verweij note 
“important to articulate, outline, and discuss the meaning and status of 
solidarity as a concept” not in the least so we can get a clearer idea of where 
it sits “within our normative discourse” (p. 4).
17 
 
4.2 Payments & social meaning 
As I noted earlier part of the reasoning presented in the report for 
considering payment for egg donation for research is the parallel with 
clinical trials involving healthy volunteers: 
Like healthy volunteers in first-in-human trials, women who 
donate eggs for research undergo medical procedures that 
involve discomfort, inconvenience and potential health risk, 
with the aim of enhancing scientific knowledge and hence 
potentially producing long-term health benefit (p. 183).
1 
Yet women who donate eggs for treatment undergo the exact same 
‘discomfort, inconvenience and potential health risk’. One response to this 
is to point out that justice is served for those who agree to egg-sharing. 
They get the requisite recompense and benefit through the reduction of the 
cost of their own fertility treatments. However, this still leaves the question 
of encouraging women to donate who are not themselves undergoing IVF 
treatment (assuming, of course, that this is, in the round, a good and 
desirable thing to encourage). In examining this we could return to 
solidarity. It is true that the women who agree to egg-sharing are to some 
extent involved in a common endeavour; they are undergoing fertility 
treatment in order to have children and so could be said to have a relevant 
connection to those other women who would benefit from receiving their 
eggs. But to only focus on these women would suggest that it is somehow 
more proper or ethical that women with fertility problems donate to other 
women with fertility problems. However, even though the report sees it as 
never acceptable to offer a direct payment in exchange for eggs for 
treatment, but supports a payment-in-kind (reduced cost fertility treatment), 
what makes this acceptable is the sense of connection between the act of 
donation and the benefit received. Yet, as the Council itself, accepts there 
are other values and reasons to be considered. This is why, solidarity aside, 
they place egg-sharing on the non-altruist focused part of their intervention 
ladder. This is recognition that there can be powerful motivations at play; 
motivations which one might argue could be greater even than enticing 
sums of cash. If this is correct, and I do not doubt that it is, then it is at least 
possible that there would be fewer pressures upon those women who are not 
themselves undergoing IVF but who might agree to donate in exchange for 
payment. In saying this we should note that the Council is not completely 
ruling out payments or financial incentives in this arena, what they are 
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concerned about is the social meaning of any payments or tokens which are 
given. Consequently, the report says: 
The Council rejects outright the concept of paying a 'purchase' 
price for gametes, where any payment made is understood as 
payment for the gamete itself, rather than as recompense or 
reward to the donor herself or himself (p. 180).
1 
In this respect, for women who donate, but are not part of an egg-sharing 
arrangement, reward that is not framed as direct payment might be 
acceptable. This would be consistent with the approach to eggs for research 
where payment above expenses incurred is framed as compensation for 
‘discomfort, inconvenience and potential health risk’. However, it is 
explicitly acknowledged in the report that any such move would need to be 
preceded by robust empirical investigation into the effects on children of 
financial incentives for the donation of gametes (p. 182).
1 
 
4.3 Other biomaterials for research 
Whatever the arguments regarding parallels and distinctions between eggs 
for treatment and those for research, we might think that there are closer 
parallels to be drawn between the latter and other biomaterials for research. 
Let us consider again the reasoning presented in the report for considering 
payment for egg donation. As we saw earlier, the Council says: 
[W]e consider that where there are no clear recipients (known 
or unknown) of the donated material, a move away from a 
primarily altruistic model of donation may not present a risk of 
undermining solidarity, as expressed for example in a 
communal commitment to the provision of materials needed by 
others for the preservation or improvement of their health (p. 
13).
1 
Further, it also argues: 
[W]e suggest that another value, justice, becomes applicable 
here, and that, if donors are prepared to undertake these 
procedures to benefit scientific endeavour and the wider 
community, it is only just that their contribution should be 
explicitly recognised (pp. 13-4).
1 
Here the report might just as well be describing the case for payments as 
applied to any tissue. These donations might also represent ‘a communal 
commitment to the provision of materials needed by others for the 
preservation or improvement of their health’ and be done to ‘benefit 
scientific endeavour’. If this is the justification for payments then it would 
also seem to be a matter of justice that the contributions of donors of other 
biomaterials be ‘explicitly recognised’. Yet despite the seemingly obvious 
applicability of these arguments to other biomaterials, an ethical assessment 
of payment for non-reproductive tissues for research is not dealt with by the 
report. One might argue that here there is an asymmetry between what is 
considered appropriate incentivisation when applied to eggs for research 
and that applied to the donation of other tissues for research. Although a 
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salient point distinguishing them might be that there is more time, 
inconvenience, and discomfort involved in egg donation, such a difference 
is merely one of degree and could be reflected in the level of recompense 
offered.  
Despite this, I do not take it that there is a lack of support in principle 
for a payments scheme for non-reproductive tissues. The Council’s position 
in this regard is a pragmatic one. There to is not a lack of willingness on the 
part of individuals to donate non-reproductive tissue for research (p. 185)
1
 
and where there are perceived shortages this is often due to access problems 
instead (p. 92). For that reason, with regards to these tissues the focus in the 
report is on issues of consent, access to existing research materials, and 
infrastructure. Although similar reasons which justify permitting payments 
for eggs for research would also justify payments for other tissues, such 
incentives do need to be put in place if there are adequate biomaterials 
available to researchers. In a limited resource environment it would not be 
prudent to spend extra money on giving financial incentives where there is 
no obvious need to incentivise. Instead efforts are better focused at enabling 
researchers to access existing holdings of biomaterials. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As I said at the beginning this is a comprehensive and informative report 
and there is much to recommend it. The remit of the report is wide-ranging 
from therapeutic uses of organs and tissues, through the gamut of uses for 
research, to first-in-man trials. Although it is broad in its subject matter it 
manages to draw meaningful parallels between the different areas 
examined. I am not convinced by the distinction, underpinned by an 
apparently normative account of solidarity, which purports to show how we 
should approach the issue of financial incentives in therapy as opposed to 
research. Nonetheless, the general analysis given is nuanced and 
appropriately takes empirical and pragmatic points into account. The most 
significant contribution of this report is that it makes evident, in a publicly 
visible format, the shift in thinking with regards to human biomaterials 
which has taken place since its last report on the issue. It recognises that 
one size fits all proposals are not suitable, given the changing biomedical 
landscape, for encouraging and governing donation of biomaterials for 
medical and research purposes; as a document which makes 







Quigley, M., ‘From Human Tissue to Human Bodies: Donation, 





                                                 
1
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Human Bodies: Donation for Medicine 
and Research. 2011.  
Available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/Donation_full_report.pd
f. Accessed 24 Mar 2012. 
 
2
 For a view from inside the Nuffield Council Working Party see Strathern 
M & Wright K. Donating bodily material: the Nuffield Council report. 
Clinical Ethics 2011; 6: 191-194. 
 
3
 For a summary of the main recommendations and conclusions see 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Summary of Report - Human bodies: 
donation for medicine and research.  
Available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/Donation_one_page_su
mmary.pdf. Acessed 29 Mar 2012. 
 
4




Accessed 29 mar 2012. 
 
5
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. Give or take? Human Bodies in Medicine 
and Research. Consultation Paper, April 2010. Available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/Human%20bodies%20i
n%20medicine%20and%20research%20consultation%20paper.pdf. 
Accessed 29 mar 2012. 
 
6
 For general information on the consultation see 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/human-bodies. Accessed 29 mar 2012. 
 
7
 Arnold et al, ‘Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An 
Ethical Reappraisal’, Transplantation, 73(8) (2002), 1361-7 
 
8
 Goodwin M. Biolaw: A few thoughts about altruism and markets. Kan JL 
Pub Poly 2008; 18: 208-14. 
 
9
 Hippen B & Matas A. Incentives for organ donation in the United States: 
feasible alternative or forthcoming apocalypse? Current Opinion in Organ 
Transplantation 2009; 14: 140-6. 
 
10
 Delmonico FL et al. Ethical incentives – not payment – for organ 
donation. New England Journal of Medicine 2002; 346(25): 2002-5  
 
Quigley, M., ‘From Human Tissue to Human Bodies: Donation, 




                                                                                                                           
 
11
 Steelman A. When altruism isn’t enough: the case for compensating 
kidney donors. Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, 2009. 
 
12
 Quigley M. Incentivising organ donation. In: Farrell AM, Price D, 
Quigley M. Organ Shortage: Ethics Law and Pragmatism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011: 89-103. 
 
13
 van Dijk G and Hilhorst M. Financial Incentives for Organ Donation: An 
Investigation of the Ethical Issues (Ethics and Health Monitoring Report 
2007/3). The Hague: Centre for Ethics and Health, 2007, p. 16. Available at 
http://www.ceg.nl/uploads/publicaties/Orgaandonatie_Engels.pdf. Accessed 
29 Mar 2012.  
 
14
 Nuffield Council on Bioethics. HFEA approves increased compensation 
for egg and sperm donors. 19 Oct 2011. Available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/news/hfea-approves-increased-
compensation-egg-and-sperm-donors. Accessed 29 Mar 2012. 
 
15
 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. HFEA agrees new 
policies to improve sperm and egg donation services’, 19 Oct 2011. 
Available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/6700.html. Accessed 29 Mar 2012. 
 
16
 Prainsack B & Buyx A. Solidarity: reflections on an emerging concept in 
bioethics. 2011.  
Available at 
http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/sites/default/files/NCOB_Solidarity_repor
t_FINAL.pdf. Accessed 29 Mar 2012. 
 
17
 Dawson A. & Verweij M. Solidarity: A moral concept in need of 
clarification. Public Health Ethics 2012; 5(1): 1-5. 
